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Abstract
We present a formal model of government control of the media to illuminate variation
in media freedom across countries and over time, with particular application to less
democratic states. The extent of media freedom depends critically on two variables:
the mobilizing character of the government and the size of the advertising market.
Media bias is greater and state ownership of the media more likely when the need
for mobilization is large; however, the distinction between state and private media
is smaller. Large advertising markets reduce media bias in both state and private
media, but increase the incentive for the government to nationalize private media.
We illustrate these arguments with a case study of media freedom in postcommunist
Russia, where media bias has responded to the mobilizing needs of the Kremlin and
government control over the media has grown in tandem with the size of the advertising
market.
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1 Introduction
A substantial literature ties media freedom to good governance.1 Less is known about the
determinants of media freedom itself. Although correlated with the presence of democratic
institutions, political institutions alone do not determine media freedom. As Figure 1 illus-
trates, many nondemocracies have higher levels of media freedom than many democracies,
and among the least democratic countries there is little obvious relationship between political
institutions and media freedom.2 Moreover, media freedom often 
uctuates within countries
even as political institutions remain unchanged.
What accounts for variation in media freedom across countries and over time? In this
paper, we provide a formal framework to explore this question. We focus especially on less
democratic states where the government uses the media to mobilize citizens in support of
actions that may not be in their individual best interest, though some of our arguments may
also apply to democracies. We emphasize variation along two dimensions of media freedom:
media ownership, by which we generally mean whether the media are state-owned or private,
and media bias, which we dene as the extent to which the media misreport the news in
favor of government interests. As we show, media ownership typically in
uences media bias,
but media ownership itself is endogenous to the anticipated bias under state and private
ownership.
Our theoretical framework stresses a fundamental constraint facing any government seek-
ing to in
uence media content: bias in reporting reduces the informational content of the
news, thus lowering the likelihood that individuals who need that information to make de-
cisions will read, watch, or listen to it (e.g., Besley and Prat, 2006). At the margin, pro-
government bias therefore reduces media consumption. In a case that we discuss at length
below, for example, the change in editorial policy that accompanied the Kremlin takeover
of a private Russian television station caused that station's viewership to drop by approxi-
mately one third. This constraint operates in two ways. First, excessive media bias works
against the government's desire for mobilization, as citizens who ignore the news cannot be
in
uenced by it. Second, media bias reduces advertising revenue, as media consumption is
less when pro-government bias is large. In general, this reduction in advertising revenue is
costly to the government, regardless of whether the media are state owned (to the extent
that prots and losses of state-owned companies are internalized) or private (because the
government must subsidize private owners to compensate for lost revenue).
We highlight two variables that in
uence the operation of this constraint. First, the
mobilizing character of the government determines the value the government places on the
mobilization of citizens to take actions that are not necessarily in their individual best in-
terest. Although many of our examples of media bias emphasize \positive" mobilization, as
when the government encourages citizens to vote or demonstrate in favor of the incumbent
regime (Magaloni, 2006; Simpser, 2007), in principle mobilization may also be \negative,"
as when the government discourages citizens from protesting against the regime (Lorentzen,
2008). In either case, what is important is that there is some potential con
ict of inter-
1Representative recent work includes Besley and Burgess (2002); Adser a, Boix, and Payne (2003);
Brunetti and Weder (2003); Reinikka and Svensson (2005); Prat and Str omberg (2006); and Treisman
(2007).
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Figure 1: Media freedom and democracy. Media freedom is Freedom House Press Freedom
Score, reordered so that higher values correspond to greater media freedom. Freedom House
classies countries as \Free," \Partly Free," and \Not Free," as indicated. Democracy is
polity2 variable from Policy IV dataset. Values plotted are averages for 1993{2004.
est between the government and citizens. When the value placed on mobilization (positive
or negative) is large, the government is more willing to pay the cost (foregone advertis-
ing revenue or subsidies) of media bias. Media bias may therefore be greater in autocratic
states whose leaders aim to transform society, or under populist governments that retain
power through mass public participation, than in \kleptocracies" or \sultanistic" regimes.3
Moreover, holding regime type constant, media bias will be greater in periods when mobiliza-
tion is especially important, as during an election campaign. Consistent with cross-country
evidence (Djankov, McLeish, Nenova, and Shleifer, 2003), bias is generally greater in state-
owned media, though as mobilization increases in importance, bias in state and private media
converge. Despite this convergence, the government may be more inclined to seize ownership
of private media when mobilization is important, as it can save the cost of subsidization by
controlling the media directly.
Second, the size of the advertising market, which may be in
uenced by such factors as me-
dia technology and economic regulation, determines the opportunity cost of lost consumers
due to pro-government bias in reporting. In the words of a Mexican journalist working in the
1990s at the independent La Jornada, \telling the truth is good business" (Lawson, 2002, p.
3This argument has parallels in Wintrobe's (1990) suggestion that repression will be greater under \total-
itarian" than \tinpot" dictatorships. The distinction between mobilizing and non-mobilizing dictatorships
has its roots in Friedrich and Brzezinski (1965). Przeworski et al. (2000) dene mobilizing dictatorships as
those with at least one political party. In the case study below we discuss the shift toward a more mobilizing
government in Russia as the United Russia party and related organizations developed under Vladimir Putin.
289), though the extent to which that is the case depends on the responsiveness of advertisers
to circulation, viewership, or listenership. Consistent with the ndings of an emerging em-
pirical and theoretical literature,4 we show that private media are generally less biased when
the advertising market is large, as purchasing in
uence through subsidization or outright
bribery is relatively expensive for the government. We advance on this understanding with
two new results. First, we show that growth in the advertising market can also reduce media
bias under state ownership, though because the government need not bargain to achieve
bias when it directly controls the media, this eect will be comparatively small. Second,
and more important, we demonstrate that the government may seize ownership of the media
for itself when the advertising market is large. Not only can the government implement
a higher level of bias when it owns the media|an advantage that grows with the size of
the advertising market|but it can economize on subsidies and acquire advertising revenue
for itself. A surprising implication of this analysis is that the relationship between media
freedom and the size of the advertising market may be nonmonotonic. Holding ownership
constant, growth in the advertising market reduces media bias, regardless of whether the
media are private or state-owned. However, the same growth may prompt the government
to seize direct control of the media, which leads to a discontinuous jump in media bias.
We illustrate our theoretical model with a case study of government control of the media
in postcommunist Russia. Largely created from scratch after the collapse of communism,
Russia's advertising market has grown dramatically in recent years, a development that
would seem to bode well for media freedom. Yet by most accounts, Russia has seen an
equally dramatic decline in media independence, as the Kremlin has seized direct control
of large segments of the Russian media market. Our model suggests two complementary
explanations for this phenomenon. First, Russian president Vladimir Putin seemed more
predisposed to use the media to mobilize society in support of his rule than his predecessor
Boris Yeltsin. Second, the Kremlin may have been motivated to prevent private media,
newly 
ush with advertising revenue, from asserting their independence. Our model also
provides a theoretical framework for understanding other developments in the relationship
between media and the state in postcommunist Russia, such as the convergence in bias among
private and state-owned media prior to the 1996 presidential election and the behavior of
more and less commercial stations controlled by the government in the run-up to the 2007
parliamentary election.
Our theory builds on two modeling traditions in the political economy literature. First,
we follow the approach pioneered by Shleifer and Vishny (1994) in modeling a bargaining
relationship between a politician and a rm, which in our case corresponds to a media
outlet. As in Shleifer and Vishny, we emphasize the allocation of control rights, which in
our setting is the ability to decide what to report. Under state ownership, the government
possesses this right. We refer to this environment as \direct government control" of the
media, to emphasize that the government chooses media bias directly. In contrast, under
private ownership, a private owner possesses the right to choose what to report. We term
this situation \indirect government control," as the government may still induce media bias
4Petrova (2008b) provides evidence based on the statistical analysis of data from the nineteenth-century
U.S. Historical accounts include Baldasty (1992) and Starr (2004). For theoretical analysis, see Besley and
Prat (2006) and Petrova (2008a).
3but must pay for it by providing subsidies to the private owner.
Second, we build on a growing body of work that attempts to explain the origins of media
bias. Existing work stresses the inherent biases of media owners (Gabszewicz et al., 2001) or
journalists (Baron, 2006; Puglisi, 2006); the market response to consumer demand for bias,
which arises either for exogenous reasons (Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005) or because rms
skew their reporting toward consumer priors to build a reputation for quality (Gentzkow
and Shapiro, 2006);5 dierences in the demand for media across groups with dierent policy
preferences (Str omberg, 2004; Dyck, Moss, and Zingales, 2008); the interaction of market
forces and the internal structure of the media (Bovitz, Druckman, and Lupia, 2002); and the
purchase of journalists by special interests (Petrova, 2008a). A useful distinction sometimes
made in this literature is between \demand-side" and \supply-side" explanations of media
bias. Our paper falls into the latter category: citizens in our model always prefer less pro-
government bias to more.
Relative to most of this literature, the key distinction of our approach is that we model
the government as a strategic actor. Besley and Prat (2006) do consider government in-

uence over the media, but their emphasis is the impact of media freedom on government
accountability in democracies. Our approach is complementary: we analyze the relation-
ship between government and the media in an environment that may best characterize weak
democracies and autocracies. Other models of media manipulation in dictatorships include
Egorov, Guriev, and Sonin (2006), Debs (2007), Edmond (2008), and Lorentzen (2008). Our
contribution diers from these in that we explicitly compare media bias under private and
state ownership and that we endogenize media ownership, showing in each case how the
actions of the government depend on its mobilizing character and the size of the advertising
market.
Within the literature on media bias, our theoretical framework is most closely related to
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006). As in their work, we model Bayesian citizens who may use
information reported by the media when making a costly decision whose outcome depends
on the state of the world. The questions we explore in this framework, however, are very
dierent from those that Gentzkow and Shapiro pose. Our approach is also similar in some
respects to Petrova (2008a), who like us examines the tradeo between advertising revenue
and bias. In our case, however, we treat the government as the relevant special interest, an
important distinction since the government may acquire control of the media by force. As we
show, the government may be more motivated to seize private media when the advertising
market is large, implying a relationship between advertising revenue and media freedom
counter to that predicted by Petrova but observed in the Russian case that we discuss.
Our adoption of a Bayesian framework captures in a tractable way the assumption that
individuals' beliefs can be aected by what they see, read, and hear in the media. Numer-
ous studies have examined and generally armed this proposition in the American context;
Kinder (1998) and Goldstein and Ridout (2004) provide reviews of the literature. Stud-
ies in immature democracies have found media eects that, if anything, are stronger than
those typically identied in the U.S. These include White, Oates, and McAllister (2005) and
Enikolopov, Petrova, and Zhuravskaya (2007) on Russia; Lawson and McCann (2007) on
5The latter paper builds on the insight that rational individuals may have a preference for biased infor-
mation; see Calvert (1985).
4Mexico; and Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004) on the Mideast.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we examine media bias under direct gov-
ernment control, i.e., when the media are state-owned. In Section 3, we analyze the case of
indirect government control, i.e., state subsidization of privately owned media. We endoge-
nize government control in Section 4, asking when the government would choose to take over
privately owned media. Section 5 extends the model to multiple media outlets. Although
general results are dicult to derive, we show that our key arguments hold for two important
special cases: when each media outlet possesses complete market power, and when stations
are perfect substitutes for each other. We illustrate our model with a case study of media
freedom in postcommunist Russia in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Direct Government Control of the Media
2.1 Environment
Consider a model with two sets of players: a continuum of citizens of mass one, indexed by
i 2 [0;1], and a government that directly controls a media outlet (i.e., the media outlet is
\state-owned"). As we discuss below, various features of the model lend themselves best to
broadcast media. For concreteness, we therefore say that citizens \watch" the news, and we
often refer to the media outlet as a \station."
At a cost normalized to one, each citizen i may \invest" in a single project, i 2 f0;1g.
The private return from investment depends on the state of the world S 2 fL;Hg, where
L denotes a \low" state and H a \high" state. The government prefers more investment
to less regardless of the state, and so it may have an incentive to mobilize citizens to take
actions that are not in their individual best interest. (We use the term \investment" in
the general sense of a costly action that provides a random return, and we employ the
terms \investment" and \mobilization" interchangeably throughout the text.) As we discuss
above, this con
ict of interest may best characterize autocracies and weak democracies,
though there are circumstances in mature democracies to which the model may also apply.
Clearly, \mobilization" can be interpreted in the negative sense of discouraging citizens from
taking some action (e.g., not participating in an anti-regime protest), so long as the con
ict
of interest remains.6
In particular, when S = H the project yields a private return r > 1, whereas when S = L
the private return is equal to zero. Citizens do not know the state but have a common prior
belief that the state is high with probability  2 (0;1). We assume that r < 1, which
implies that in the absence of any additional information citizens do not invest.
Citizens may update their belief about the state of the world by watching the news. A
news broadcast contains one of two messages, ^ S 2
n
^ H; ^ L
o
. Rather than choosing the mes-
sage directly, we assume that the government structures the news operation to attain the
desired level of bias, with the message determined probabilistically by the structure after the
6An \economic" example of investment (one that may apply to any regime type) is as follows: the
government prefers that economic actors behave as if the central banker is conservative, whether he is or
not, but economic actors prefer to forego price increases only if he is.
5state of the world has been realized. This implicitly captures the need to delegate respon-
sibility for the news to the reporters, anchors, and editors who make daily decisions about
what to cover and how to cover it. At one Kremlin-controlled radio station, for example,
journalists were told that 50 percent of their stories about Russia should be \positive"; the
stories were not chosen by the Kremlin itself.7 Importantly, we assume that this choice is
observable by all citizens. This assumption seems especially compelling for broadcast media,
the primary news source for citizens in most countries. For example, CNN programs hosted
by Lou Dobbs and Anderson Cooper are easily distinguishable, and the replacement of con-
servative commentator Tucker Carlson on MSNBC was viewed by many (including Carlson
himself) as a shift in editorial line.8
In particular, at the beginning of the game, prior to realization of the state of the world,
the government publicly chooses an editorial policy  (S) 2 [0;1]  [0;1], where  (S) is
the probability that the station reports the message ^ H when the state is S 2 fL;Hg. We
abuse notation slightly to denote any citizen's posterior belief about the state of the world,




.9 Thus, conditional on having





Watching the news may therefore be protable to citizens if the government's editorial
policy  (S) is such that the news is suciently informative. Potentially osetting this
benet, each citizen i has an exogenous idiosyncratic opportunity cost of watching the news
i, where i is a random variable distributed uniformly on [0;m]. We assume for simplicity
that m > r   1, which implies that for all  the proportion of individuals who watch the
news in equilibrium is strictly less than one. We use the indicator variable !i, which is a
function !i : [0;m] ! f0;1g, to denote the decision to watch the news.
Our assumption that this opportunity cost is exogenous applies most clearly to broadcast
media, where there is no purchasing decision to be made so long as a citizen already possesses
a television or radio. In this context, the opportunity cost of watching the news may re
ect
a citizen's work schedule, family obligations, and similar considerations. For print media,
the opportunity cost would also re
ect the purchase price, which would be a choice variable
of the media owner. We choose to leave that extension to future research.
Similarly, our model could easily be extended to incorporate consumer demand for pro-
government bias, as might be the case if some citizens have no \investment" decision to make
but derive utility from having their pro-government views reinforced on the news. So long
as this demand is not too large, pro-government bias still reduces viewership at the margin,
and our qualitative results continue to hold.
Summarizing, the timing of events is:
1. The government chooses an editorial policy  (S) 2 [0;1][0;1], which is observed by
7\50% Good News Is the Bad News in Russian Radio," New York Times, April 22, 2007. Remington
(1989) describes the Soviet media in similar terms, noting that the delegation of authority made it dicult for
Gorbachev to quickly liberalize the media. For a few exceptional stories, however, including the Chernobyl
disaster, the Kremlin directly chose the message to be reported. Our model may be less applicable to such
cases.
8See, for example, \At MSNBC, `Tucker' Is Out, and David Gregory Is In," New York Times, March 11,
2008.
9For those who do not watch the news, the posterior belief is equal to the prior belief.
6all citizens.
2. Each citizen decides whether to watch the news, !i 2 f0;1g.
3. The state of the world S 2 fL;Hg is realized, with the message ^ S 2
n
^ H; ^ L
o
determined
probabilistically according to  (S): Only citizens who watch the news receive the
message ^ S.
4. Each citizen decides whether to invest in the project, i 2 f0;1g.
In general, we assume that the government may value viewership as well as the mobi-
lization of citizens to \invest," to the extent that viewership increases advertising revenue at
(and thus may reduce the cost of running) the state-owned station. We model this concern in
a reduced-form way, assuming that total advertising revenue is proportional to viewership.
Let 
 denote the size of the market. Further, assume that the government's preferences
over investment and advertising revenue are separable, such that those preferences can be
represented by the following utility function:













E [!i (i)]di: (1)
The rst term is proportional to expected investment (by assumption, a citizen chooses to
invest only if she watches the news, which depends on her opportunity cost of watching
the news i, and for those who do watch the decision to invest may be conditioned on the
message ^ S, which is a function of the state of the world S), with expectations over i and
S, and the second term is expected advertising revenue, with expectations over i. The
parameter   denotes the mobilizing character of the government, i.e., the weight that the
government puts on investment relative to advertising revenue.10 To establish intuition for
the behavior of citizens and the government, we begin by deriving equilibrium media bias as
 

 ! 1, i.e., when the government values only mobilization. We then examine the general
case where the government values both mobilization and advertising revenue.
2.2 Equilibrium When Government Values Only Mobilization
We solve for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of this dynamic game of incomplete information,
focusing in this section on the special case where the government values only the mobilization
of citizens to \invest," i.e., to take costly actions that are not necessarily in their individual
best interest. To begin, note that the government wants citizens to believe that S = H, as
it is protable for citizens to invest only when the state is H. Therefore, in equilibrium,
it must be the case that  (H) = 1.11 However, it cannot be the case in equilibrium that
the station always reports that the state is H, i.e., that it also chooses  (L) = 1, as then
the news would be uninformative. Regardless of the message ^ S, any citizen who watched
the news would choose not to invest; given the opportunity cost of watching the news, all
citizens would therefore choose not to watch. Thus, in equilibrium the media must truthfully
10Although mathematically super
uous in this setting, the use of two parameters aids interpretation. In
Sections 3{5, both parameters are necessary.
11This assumes that messages have the \natural" meaning. Otherwise, the equilibria that we describe
could be relabeled such that the message ^ H is associated with the state L, and vice versa.
7report the state with some positive probability when the state is L, i.e., the government must
choose  (L) < 1.
To solve for the equilibrium bias  (L), we begin by considering the beliefs and invest-
ment behavior of those who watch the news. Using the equilibrium condition that citizens
update beliefs on the equilibrium path according to Bayes' rule, we can derive the posterior







 (H) + (1   ) (L)
=

 + (1   ) (L)
; (2)
where the second equality follows from  (H) = 1. The higher is media bias  (L), the less
likely citizens are to believe that the state is H when they receive the message ^ H. Similarly,




= 0, which follows trivially from  (H) = 1. Thus, citizens would never
invest after receiving the report ^ L, but they might invest after receiving the message ^ H if




r > 1. Intuitively, citizens invest after receiving
the message ^ H only if the government is suciently likely to tell the truth when the state is
in fact L. In the analysis to follow, we assume preliminarily that this is the case and then
show that this condition holds in equilibrium.




r > 1, which implies that citizens invest if
(and only if) they receive the message ^ H, the expected benet from watching the news is









The term on the left is the probability that a citizen receives the message ^ H, conditional
on watching the news, whereas the term on the right is the expected payo from investing,
having received the message ^ H. This expression is decreasing in  (L): demand for the news
is greatest when bias is least.
With the opportunity cost of watching the news i distributed uniformly on [0;m], the
expected mass of individuals who watch the news is given by
Z 1
0
E [!i (i)]di =
1
m









Because citizens invest if and only if they receive the message ^ H, the probability that any
citizen invests, conditional on having watched the news, is equal to the probability that the
government reports ^ H,  + (1   ) (L), which is increasing in media bias  (L). Expected
investment is then equal to the product of this probability and the expected mass of citizens







































8This is a concave problem, the solution to which is








Equation 5 says that when  (L) > 0, media bias is greater, i.e.,  (L) is larger, the
larger is the payo from investment r. Intuitively, when the payo from making the right
investment decision is relatively large, citizens watch the news even when news content is
noisy. In addition, media bias is (weakly) increasing in , which measures the prior belief
that the state is high. As Equation 2 shows, media bias plays a smaller role in determination
of the posterior belief that the state is high when  is large, implying that bias must be
greater to have the same marginal impact on investment.




r > 1. We may verify this








= 1 when  (L) = 0|




r > 1 holds trivially given r > 1,




r > 1 is equivalent to







r >  +
(r   2)
2
, r > 0:
Similarly, we may show that  (L) is strictly less than 1:
(r   2) < 2(1   ) , r < 2;
which always holds given the assumption that r < 1.
2.3 Equilibrium When Government Values Mobilization and Ad-
vertising Revenue
In Section 2.2, we analyze the special case of the model where the government values only
\investment" by citizens. This case illustrates the tradeo between raising bias to increase
investment by those who watch the news and lowering bias to increase the proportion of cit-
izens who watch the news and thus receive the government's message. In addition to these
concerns, however, governments may be motivated to a greater or lesser degree to increase
advertising revenue for media under their control. In Russia, for example, Channel One and
Rossiya, the two most purely state-owned national television networks, run advertisements
during their prime-time news broadcasts. Nonetheless, these advertisements generally ap-
pear at the \corners" of the broadcasts where viewership is less. In contrast, NTV, the
somewhat more commercial network controlled by majority-state-owned Gazprom, typically
9runs advertisements in the middle of its main evening news broadcast, suggesting a greater
emphasis on advertising revenue.12
How does a concern for advertising revenue modify the results above? To answer this
question, we examine the general case of the model, where the government chooses media
































r > 1. This is a concave problem, the
solution to which we provide in the following proposition, where for future reference we use
the subscript G to denote direct government control.
Proposition 1. Under direct government control of the media (i.e., state ownership), the
equilibrium level of bias is


G (L) = max

0;
 (r   2)   





G (L) > 0, media bias is greater when the government has a particular interest
in mobilizing citizens to \invest" (i.e., when   is large), as during an election campaign
when state-owned media are used to increase support for government-backed parties and
candidates. More subtly, Equation 6 suggests that the impact on 
G (L) of a marginal
increase in   is greater when the government values advertising revenue more to begin with
(i.e., when   is low).13 As we discuss below, this may explain the particularly noticeable
increase in bias on Gazprom-owned NTV in the run-up to the 2007 Russian parliamentary
election.
In addition, Equation 6 shows that media bias is less, the greater is 
, i.e., the larger is the
advertising market.14 This result supports the argument that the media may be less biased
when the advertising market is large. As we discuss above, however, this argument is typically
made in the context of private ownership of the media, a case that we examine below. Our
model shows that the same relationship may hold when the media are state-owned, so long
as the government values advertising revenue from media that it owns. Intuitively, the
equilibrium level of bias depends on the degree to which the government internalizes the
negative eect of bias on viewership. That eect is greater when the advertising market is
large, so long as the government places some value on advertising revenue.
12The absolute value of advertising revenue is greater on Channel One, but this re
ects its broader national
distribution. Our judgment that NTV places greater value on advertising revenue was corroborated in a
personal interview with the editor of one of these evening news programs.
13To see this, note that for 
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 3(1 ) < 0.









r > 1 must hold here, given that it does there.
103 Indirect Government Control of the Media
In the previous section, we assume that the government has direct control over the media
outlet. Even if the station owner is private, however, the government may be able to indi-
rectly control news content, providing various inducements to encourage the private owner
to bias coverage away from the commercial optimal editorial policy. Lawson (2002) reports,
for example, that at the height of its control, Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party
provided various benets to private media in return for favorable coverage, including tax
privileges, subsidized newsprint, and cash payments to journalists. As a consequence, \a
plethora of pro-government newspapers could operate without serious regard to circulation,
commercial advertising, or other normal requisites of nancial viability" (Lawson, 2002, p.
32). Similarly, McMillan and Zoido (2004) document the regular provision of cash payments
and directed government advertising to the media by Peruvian secret-police chief Vladimiro
Montesinos Torres. Notably, no such payments were necessary to the one state-owned tele-
vision channel, as \Montesinos had control over its content" (McMillan and Zoido, 2004, p.
79).
Conceptually, the relationship between government and private owner is analogous to a
lobbying problem, though here the government plays the role of lobby and private owner
the role of policy maker. As is standard in the political-economy literature, we model the
lobbying process process as a menu auction  a la Grossman and Helpman (1994, 2001), where
the lobby (here, government) provides a \contribution schedule" that promises a particular
contribution (subsidy) for every policy (bias) that the policy maker (private owner) could
choose.
Formally, assume that the government has preferences over citizen investment and con-
tributions represented by the utility function







!i (i); ^ S (S)
i
di   C; (7)
where the rst term is proportional to expected investment and C is a contribution, dened
below, from the government to the private owner. In this context, the parameter   measures
the degree to which the government values investment (mobilization) relative to subsidies.
Implicitly, we assume that subsidies and advertising revenue are denominated in the same
units, so that   has the same meaning in Equations 1 and 7. Note that the government does
not directly value advertising revenue received by the private owner.
The private owner, in contrast, has preferences over advertising revenue and contributions





E [!i (i)]di + C; (8)
where the rst term is expected advertising revenue and C is the subsidy from the government
to the private owner. Analogous to the government's preferences, the private owner does not
directly value citizen investment.
At the beginning of the game, the government names a contribution schedule C ( (S))
that promises a particular subsidy C  0 for all  (S) 2 [0;1]  [0;1], i.e., for any editorial
11policy that could be chosen by the private owner. As in Grossman and Helpman (1994, 2001),
we assume that this promise is binding. This can easily be motivated either on reputational
grounds or because lobbying is a spot-market transaction with few dynamic considerations,
similar to the exchange of money for goods in a retail environment. The private owner then
chooses  (S) to maximize Expression 8. The remainder of the game is identical to that in
Section 2.1. Thus, the timing of events is:
1. The government names a contribution schedule C ( (S)).
2. The private owner chooses an editorial policy  (S) 2 [0;1]  [0;1], which is observed
by the government and all citizens, and the government pays C ( (S)).
3. Each citizen decides whether to watch the news, !i 2 f0;1g.
4. The state of the world S 2 fL;Hg is realized, with the message ^ S 2
n
^ H; ^ L
o
determined
probabilistically according to  (S): Only citizens who watch the news receive the
message ^ S.
5. Each citizen decides whether to invest in the project, i 2 f0;1g.
Given that subsidies enter linearly into both the government's and private owner's utility
functions (i.e., because utility is freely transferable between the two actors), the equilibrium















This is precisely the government's maximization problem under direct control of the media,
implying that the equilibrium level of bias is the same as in Proposition 1. Intuitively, in
making its oer C ( (S)) to the private owner, the government fully internalizes the impact
of bias on advertising revenue, as it must compensate the private owner for any advertising
revenue lost due to bias in reporting.
The sharp prediction that media bias is the same under government and private ownership|
a consequence of the Coase theorem|follows from the assumption that the government can
costlessly transfer utility to the private owner. That assumption may fail for various reasons.
For example, because of political considerations the government may subsidize the private
owner through non-monetary transfers, as when the government provides transmission fre-
quencies to favored enterprises.15 The opportunity cost to the treasury of providing those
transfers may be greater than the benet to the private owner. Alternatively, as discussed
above, \subsidies" may actually be outright bribes to journalists and media ocials. In the
latter case, the eort to keep bribes secret might impose transaction costs.
We follow Besley and Prat (2006) in modeling these considerations in a reduced-form
way, assuming that the private owner receives proportion 1
 of any subsidy paid by the
government, where the parameter   1.16 Thus, the private owner's utility (Equation 8
15In Russia, the allocation of spectrum was instrumental in the creation of the NTV television network
during the 1990s, as well as in the consolidation of Kremlin control of the media during the Putin era.
16Shleifer and Vishny (1994) also assume that subsidization is inecient in their canonical model of
bargaining between a politician and a rm.














E [!i (i)]di + C:
In inducing  (L), the government therefore puts greater weight on advertising revenue than
in the case of direct government control. The following proposition provides the optimum
 (L) under indirect government control of the media, where the subscript P denotes private
ownership.
Proposition 2. Under indirect government control of the media (i.e., private ownership and
state subsidies), the equilibrium level of bias is


P (L) = max

0;
 (r   2)   

2  (1   )

: (9)
The equilibrium level of bias in Proposition 2 diers from that in Proposition 1 in the
multiplier  on 
. Thus, to the extent that transaction costs prevent ecient bargaining
between the government and the private owner, bias will be less under private than state
ownership of the media. Because bias determines (probabilistically) the information available
to citizens, this in turn implies that citizens will be more poorly informed when the media are
state-owned, a result consistent with the cross-country evidence presented in Leeson (2008).
Propositions 1 and 2 show that a marginal change in   (the value the government attaches
to mobilization) aects media bias more for private media than for state-owned media, so
long as  > 1. Intuitively, the tradeo between citizen investment and advertising revenue
is starker for private media, such that an increase in the value attached to investment is
magnied relative to the case of state ownership. As we discuss below, this may help explain
the convergence in media bias on private and state-owned media in the run-up to the 1996
Russian presidential election. More generally, the model predicts that private and state-
owned media will be similarly biased in favor of the government in states that attach great
value to citizen mobilization. As we show below, however, this does not imply a tolerance
of private media in mobilizing states. Rather, the high cost of subsidization encourages
governments to seize control of private media for themselves.
With respect to the second parameter on which we focus, the dierence between direct
and indirect government control of the media is greater, the larger is the advertising market
(measured by 
). To see this clearly, focus on the case where  (r   2) > 
, so that media
bias is strictly positive even under private ownership. Then the additional bias under state
ownership is
 (r   2)   

2  (1   )
 
 (r   2)   

2  (1   )
=

 (   1)
2  (1   )
;
which is increasing in 
. This has an important consequence for media freedom: the opportu-
nity cost to the government of allowing private ownership of the media, in terms of foregone
citizen investment, is greater when the advertising market is large. In such environments,
13as we show in the following section, the government may therefore be motivated to acquire
direct control of the media.
We may use Equation 9 to derive the subsidy the government pays the private owner to
represent its point of view. To do so, rst note that were the private owner to reject the
government's oer, it would choose the level of media bias that maximizes viewership, which




= 1 when  (L) = 0, this implies













































given by Equation 2.
Thus, the government must reimburse the private owner for lost advertising revenue, which
is proportional to the equilibrium level of bias 
P (L). Using Equation 9 and the assumption
that the private owner receives proportion 1





P (L)) = 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The government subsidy is strictly increasing in the value the government places on citizen
investment (measured by  ) for all 
P (L) > 0. The greater the mobilizing character of the
government, the greater the incentive to subsidize the private owner in return for favorable
coverage. In contrast, the relationship between government subsides and the size of the
advertising market (measured by 
) is nonmonotonic. To see this, note that an increase in
the size of the advertising market has two eects. First, as the advertising market increases
in size, the government must provide a larger subsidy for a given level of bias to compensate
the private owner for lost revenue. Second, the government responds to the higher cost of
bias by inducing a smaller  (L). The second eect dominates the rst when advertising
revenue is especially important. Indeed, for 
 suciently large there is no bias, and thus no
subsidy, in equilibrium.
4 Endogenous Control of the Media
The discussion above treats control of the media as exogenous. What does the model say
about the determinants of media control?
To answer this question, rst recall that equilibrium media bias is the same under state
and private ownership when the government may costlessly subsidize the private owner.
In this case, if we assume that the government must purchase a media outlet to acquire
control, our model oers no prediction about who owns the media. In principle, acquiring
direct control provides two benets to the government: it saves the cost of subsidization and
14acquires advertising revenue for itself. However, the private owner would accept nothing less
than the value of government subsidies and advertising revenue in return for relinquishing
control, thus eliminating the incentive for the government to pay for it.
As we discuss above, however, various transaction costs may prevent the government
from costlessly subsidizing the private owner. In addition, the government diers from
market actors in a crucial respect: it can acquire direct control of the media through force.
Although this may come at some cost in political capital and international reputation, that
cost is arguably dierent from the market value of the media outlet.
Formally, assume that the station is initially privately owned, but that at the beginning
of the game the government may transfer the station to state ownership at some xed cost
 > 0.17 (Alternatively, we might think of  as the cost of maintaining government control,
in which case the government decides whether to privatize the station.) The game then
proceeds as in Section 2 or Section 3, depending on whether the government has exercised
this option.
The government acquires direct control if  is small relative to the benet of taking over



























The rst term is proportional to total expected investment, given that the government
chooses bias directly, whereas the second is expected advertising revenue in equilibrium
(Equation 11 above, where we substitute 
G (L) for 








when  (L) = 
G (L). In contrast, the payo to the
government from indirect control is
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The rst term is proportional to total expected investment, given that the government must
subsidize the private owner to induce bias, whereas the second is the cost of the subsidy to









when  (L) = 
P (L).
The additional benet to the government from acquiring direct control is the dierence
between Equations 13 and 14. To x ideas, focus on the case where  (r   2) > 
, which
implies that both 
G (L) and 
P (L) are strictly greater than zero. Then the additional

























17All of our results go through if we instead assume that the cost of nationalization is proportional to total
potential viewers, i.e., that the cost of nationalization is
(r 1)
m , where  > 0. This alternative assumption
would capture the idea that seizing a media outlet is more costly, the larger that outlet's broadcast or
distribution network. More generally, any cost of nationalization that is not a function of   or 
 leads to
the same comparative statics.





4 m , whereas total investment under
15The rst term in this expression is the additional investment under state ownership, which
results from the higher level of bias when the government chooses bias directly. The second
term is total expected advertising revenue when the news is reported without bias. In equi-
librium under private ownership, some portion of this advertising revenue is replaced with a
government subsidy. Acquiring the station saves the government that subsidy while provid-
ing the share of advertising revenue that remains. The third term re
ects the elimination
under state ownership of transaction costs associated with compensating the private owner
for lost advertising revenue.
The government chooses to take direct control of the station when Expression 15 is large
relative to . We are interested especially in how the incentive to nationalize the media
depends on the mobilizing character of the government (measured by  ) and the size of the
advertising market (measured by 
). Consider rst the impact of a marginal increase in  .
As we discuss in the previous section, the additional bias under state ownership diminishes
as the government values investment more. Thus, the advantage to the government of direct
control for the sake of investment (the rst term in Expression 15) is smaller when   is large.
However, the government also values direct control for the subsidy it saves in implementing
its desired level of bias, and this benet is larger when   is large. The following proposition
establishes that the second eect outweighs the rst, and more generally establishes that the
incentive for the government to seize direct control of the media is increasing in  , so long as
the government optimally chooses bias greater than zero when the media are state-owned.
Proposition 3. If 
G (L) > 0, a marginal increase in  , which measures the mobilizing
character of the government, (generically) increases the incentive for the government to
acquire direct control of the media. If 
G (L) = 0, a marginal increase in   (generically) has
no impact on the incentive for the government to acquire direct control of the media.
Proof. Consider the following three mutually exclusive and exhaustive cases:
1. 
G (L) > 0 and 
















which is greater than zero for  > 1.
2. 
G (L) > 0 and 



















Similarly, evaluating Expression 14 at 
P (L) = 0 gives
 2
m (r   1). The additional




















































which is greater than zero if  (r   2) > 









G (L) = 




m , which is constant in  .
Q.E.D.
Now consider the eect of an increase in 
 on the government incentive to acquire control.
If  = 1, so that there are no transaction costs associated with subsidization, then the
incentive for the government to acquire control is unambiguously greater when 
 is large.
Although bias is identical to that under private ownership, the government can save the
cost of subsidization and acquire advertising revenue for itself. More generally, for all   1,
Expression 15 is increasing in 
. Indeed, as the following proposition establishes, the incentive
for the government to acquire direct control of the media is increasing in the size of the
advertising market, even when there is no media bias under private and/or state ownership.
Proposition 4. The incentive for the government to acquire direct control of the media is
increasing in the size of the advertising market (measured by 
).
Proof. Consider the following three mutually exclusive and exhaustive cases:
1. 
G (L) > 0 and 
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2 m
For  = 1, this expression is clearly greater than zero. For  > 1, this expression














, i.e., for all 
 such that 
G (L) > 0 and 
P (L) > 0.
2. 
G (L) > 0 and 
P (L) = 0: The payo to the government from indirect control is
constant in 
, so the derivative of the additional benet of direct control with respect
to 



































which is greater than zero.
173. 
G (L) = 




m , which is increasing in 
.
Q.E.D.
The surprising implication of this analysis is that the relationship between the size of the
advertising market and media freedom may be nonmonotonic. Holding ownership constant,
growth in the advertising market reduces media bias, regardless of whether the station is
owned by the state (so long as the government places any value on advertising revenue) or
a private entity. However, the same growth may prompt the state to seize direct control of
the media, which leads to a discontinuous jump in media bias. As we discuss below, such
as eect may have played a role in encouraging Vladimir Putin's Kremlin to seize control of
Russian media just as the advertising market was beginning to provide independent media
with a measure of nancial security.
5 Multiple Media Outlets
The analysis above considers the case of one media outlet. To what extent do our results
hold when there are multiple media outlets? To explore this question, we may assume that
there are J stations indexed by j. These J stations simultaneously and publicly choose an
editorial policy j(L) 2 [0;1]; assume for simplicity that j (H) = 1 for all j. The process by
which these policies are chosen depends on ownership of the station, as in Sections 2 and 3.
Following choice of editorial policy, each citizen i decides whether to watch each station j,
!ji 2 f0;1g. Each citizen i is associated with a vector (1i;2i;:::;Ji), where ji 2 [0;m]
is citizen i's opportunity cost of watching station j. The rest of the game proceeds as before.
Although it is dicult to derive general results for this extended model, two special
(and polar) cases are particularly informative. First, assume that each station has complete
market power, with the market segmented among the J stations. Intuitively, we may think
of broadcast media whose transmission networks do not overlap. Formally, this corresponds
to the case where the population of citizens is partitioned into J sets, where citizen i in group
j has opportunity cost ki = m for all k 6= j; we assume that ji is distributed uniformly on
[0;m] for citizens in group j. Clearly, viewership for any one station is unaected by that for
the others, so this case is analogous to the baseline model: the equilibrium level of bias is the
same as that in Propositions 1 and 2, and the incentives for the government to nationalize
private media are precisely those in Section 4 .
Second, assume that from any citizen's perspective, stations are perfect substitutes for
each other, and that each citizen may watch no more than one station. Intuitively, this
corresponds to an environment with national broadcast media that broadcast the news at
the same time of the day. Formally, assume that the vector of opportunity costs is distributed
uniformly along the main diagonal of a J-dimensional cube, and we impose the additional
constraint that each citizen may watch only one station. In addition, assume that citizens
choose a station at random if indierent among stations that provide the most information,
and that each station is characterized by the same transaction cost  (if private) and size of
advertising market 
.
18If there is at least one private station, then in any pure-strategy equilibrium it must be
the case that there is a common equilibrium bias  (L) for all stations: given that stations
are perfect substitutes for each other, any station that implemented a  (L) higher than
some other station would have no viewers, implying that the owner of that station could
protably deviate to the lowest  (L) chosen by the others.19 Moreover, if  (L) > 0,




m , given by Equation 10), as any private owner could choose some  (L) <  (L)
and capture the entire advertising market for itself. As Besley and Prat (2006) show, the
fact that the government must provide each private owner with total potential advertising
revenue in return for media bias implies that bias becomes prohibitively costly when the
number of stations is large.
To see this, assume that all stations are private and that there are no transaction costs
from bargaining (i.e.,  = 1). Then if it is optimal for the government to induce a positive



































The government chooses a common editorial policy to maximize investment less the cost of
subsidies, given the constraint that each private owner be left with at least total potential
advertising revenue. (Because each station chooses the same editorial policy, advertising
revenue is divided equally among the J stations.) But for the fact that there are J constraints,
this is precisely the government's problem in the baseline model: the impact of a marginal
increase in bias on investment and advertising revenue is the same as before. Thus, if the
government chooses to induce a positive level of bias, it will be identical to that when there
is only one station. In particular, as with one station, equilibrium bias is increasing in  
and decreasing in 
.
Nonetheless, even though the (L) that solves Expression 16 is independent of the number
of stations, it may not be an equilibrium for the government to induce that bias if stations























19In principle, the government could induce a private station to choose an editorial policy that resulted
in no viewers by reimbursing it for lost advertising revenue. However, it would have no incentive to do so,
as it could save the cost of that subsidy and leave investment unaected by allowing the station to match
the lowest level of bias chosen by the other stations. Note that if all stations are state-owned, then it need
not be the case that stations choose the same  (L) in equilibrium. Even though stations that choose a
higher  (L) have zero viewership, these viewers watch some other state-owned station, and by assumption
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m
:
Clearly, for J arbitrarily large, the cost of subsidizing private stations to all implement  (L)
outweighs the benet to the government from media bias. Importantly, this eect is greater,
the larger is 
.20 Thus, to an even greater degree than in the baseline model, the government
may have an incentive to nationalize private media to reduce the cost of inducing favorable
coverage when the advertising market is large.
In summary, the key arguments of this paper hold when there are multiple media outlets,
at least for the important special cases where media outlets have complete market power
and (conversely) are perfect substitutes for each other.
6 Illustration: Media Freedom in Postcommunist Rus-
sia
In this section, we brie
y discuss the evolution of media freedom in postcommunist Russia.
Our aim is not to provide a full history of the role of the media in Russian politics, a task
that others have admirably undertaken.21 Rather, it is to show how our model can help
to illuminate an important case, and so to illustrate the contribution of our theoretical
framework. As we demonstrate, Russia is a particularly useful case to analyze, as media
freedom, the mobilizing character of the government, and the size of the advertising market
have all changed substantially over the postcommunist period.
We focus here especially on television, which has been at the center of political con
ict in
Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. From the failed putsch that triggered
the collapse, through the pivotal 1996 presidential campaign, and into the Putin era, what
is reported on national television news has been a primary concern of political actors. True
or not, there is a widespread perception that control of the airwaves is the sine qua non in
the struggle for power in Russia.
The belief that television has the power to in
uence politics is based in part on the
overwhelming reliance of the Russian public on television as an information source. Despite
Russia's vast size, by 1990 television coverage extended to nearly 100 percent of the Russian
population (White and McAllister, 2006). In contrast, national newspapers are much less










if a station chooses  (L) =  (L) and zero otherwise (i.e., oers enough that it
is not an equilibrium for all stations to choose no bias but not enough that it is an equilibrium for all to
choose  (L)), then in the unique symmetric equilibrium of the bias-setting subgame each station plays a
non-degenerate mix over  (L) = 0 and  (L) =  (L). However, it is always preferable for the government
to instead induce stations to all play either  (L) = 0 or  (L) =  (L) with certainty.
21See especially Mickiewicz (1999) and Oates (2006).
20widely circulated|the collapse of Soviet-era subscription systems led to a decline in circu-
lation of national newspapers of approximately 95 percent during the 1990s (Koikkalainen,
2007)|and are expensive relative to other goods (Fish, 2005; Lipman, 2006). National
television is particularly important, far surpassing local television in viewership (White,
McAllister, and Oates, 2002).
Consistent with our general modeling approach, Russian viewers often seem to recognize
the bias in news broadcasts and to lter reports through that understanding. Summarizing
the results of focus-group studies, Ellen Mickiewicz writes, \Viewers expect commercial and
governmental involvement in shaping the news. They believe it is the viewer's responsibility
to extract signicance and correct for bias" (Mickiewicz, 2006, p. 191, emphasis in original;
see also Mickiewicz, 2008).
Nonetheless, as we emphasize, bias can be eective in shaping the beliefs of viewers, so
long as there is some informational content in the news. This bias comes at a cost, however,
as viewers turn away from broadcasts that are perceived to be insuciently informative.
The degree to which this reduces bias depends in part on whether a media outlet is private
or state-owned, and thus on the extent to which the opportunity cost of lost advertising
revenue is internalized. In Russia, these considerations were evident in the independent
editorial line pursued by the television network NTV, a commercial entity launched in 1993.
NTV aggressively reported on the war in Chechnya, drawing viewers and advertising revenue
away from state-owned channels. The same was true at the smaller TV6, to which Eduard
Sagalaev, a veteran of perestroika-era battles over television content, migrated after becoming
convinced that the old system of censorship remained intact in the state-owned media (Benn,
1996).
Sagalaev later returned to run state television during the 1996 presidential election cam-
paign, a period when the Kremlin sought to mobilize the public to prevent a Communist
victory and the broadcast media|state and private|swung overwhelmingly behind incum-
bent president Boris Yeltsin. Oates and Roselle (2000) examine election coverage during this
campaign on NTV and state-controlled ORT, nding little dierence between the two and
concluding that \[a]lthough NTV was not under the direct control of the government, it still
`promoted' Yeltsin in its coverage" (p. 46). The emergence of pro-Kremlin bias at NTV is
consistent with the prediction of our model that an increase in  , the value the government
attaches to citizen \investment" (here, voting for Yeltsin), should disproportionately aect
private media. At the same time, it is likely that the owners of commercial media shared
the Kremlin's preference that Yeltsin win, given the fear that a victory by Communist Party
candidate Gennady Zyuganov would spell the end of independent media. In terms of our
model, private owners also directly valued citizen \investment," which increased bias relative
to the case where private owners only value advertising revenue.22
Throughout the 1990s, the broadcast media remained heavily reliant on the state for
nancial support. The advertising market was essentially non-existent under communism,

























, which is (weakly) increasing in .
21and could not develop quickly in the turbulent conditions that followed that system's collapse.
The reliance on state subsidies provided considerable leverage to state ocials. This nancial
dependence situation was, and is, especially severe at the regional level: \As much local
media funding comes from the local government (and its very existence often depends on the
goodwill of local leaders), the media are quite vulnerable to local legislation" (Oates, 2007,
p. 1287).
By the turn of the century, however, the advertising market was growing quickly. Figure
2 shows that between 1999 and 2007, advertising revenue for television, radio, and newspa-
pers sextupled in size in real terms, a growth rate roughly three times larger than that for
GDP over the same period. With 80 percent of all advertising revenue centered in Moscow
(Azhgikhina, 2007), and with the proportion of all advertising revenue earned by television
networks increasing over time, this development promised greater independence for the na-
tional broadcast media. In the words of one Russian analyst, \You can make anyone's life
dicult if you are nancially independent."23 Yet media freedom declined sharply over the
same period, counter to what would be the case if there were a simple relationship between
advertising revenue and government in
uence over media content. Figure 2 provides a rough
measure of this decline, plotting the evolution of the Freedom House Press Freedom Score
for Russia over the postcommunist period.
Earlier declines in press freedom in Russia, such as that which accompanied the 1996
presidential election campaign, can largely be attributed to changing incentives within a
given media structure. The strengthening of government control of the media under Russian
president Vladimir Putin was dierent, with the Kremlin taking over and closing down
previously independent media outlets. In terms of our model, this may have occurred for
either of two reasons, and in practice some combination of the two may have been at work.
First, relative to his predecessor, Russian president Vladimir Putin seemed more inclined
to mobilize the public in support of his rule. The Kremlin-backed United Russia party
encouraged mass organization to a degree that the various \parties of power" during the
1990s never attempted, and various pro-Putin youth groups emerged with Kremlin support.
Control of the media facilitated this strategy. Second, the timing of the Kremlin assault
coincided with the growth in advertising revenue that could have reduced state in
uence
over private media. The sometimes assertive independence of the remaining private media
suggests the threat that a nancially secure and predominately private media could have
posed to the Kremlin.
The particular methods used to establish direct government control of the media are
also consistent with our theoretical perspective.24 After taking over ownership of previously
independent NTV (through state-controlled Gazprom), the Kremlin replaced the existing
management. The new management in turn forced the removal of the station's best-known
23Valerii Fyodorov, director of the Russian Public Opinion Research Center, discussing media freedom
on the radio network Russian News Service, June 18, 2008; see http://engforum.pravda.ru/showthread.
php?t=219094. Television's share of television, radio, and newspaper advertising revenue increased from
roughly 60 percent in 1999 to approximately 80 percent in 2007. Data on advertising revenue are from Video
International, Russia's largest advertising marketer, and the Association of Communication Agencies of
Russia. Revenue from advertising-only circulars (i.e., \shoppers") are not included in newspaper advertising
revenue.
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Figure 2: Media freedom and advertising revenue in Russia. Media freedom is Freedom
House Press Freedom Score, reordered so that higher values correspond to greater media
freedom. Freedom House classies countries as \Free," \Partly Free," and \Not Free," as
indicated. Advertising revenue is for television, radio, and newspapers.
journalists, replacing them with individuals presumably comfortable with the new owner's
preferences. Much of the NTV news operation subsequently migrated to TV6, which in
turn attracted the Kremlin's attention. At rst it seemed as though a compromise might be
reached, whereby ownership of TV6 would be transferred from Russian billionaire and Putin
opponent Boris Berezovsky to a collective of establishment gures. In the end, however, TV6
was simply shut down, its frequency transferred to a 24-hour sports channel. NTV remained
on the air, but with a dramatically reduced audience, falling from 17.9 percent of all viewers
in 2000 to 12.6 percent in 2001.25
Although the number of television channels in Russia has exploded in recent years, news
broadcasts are today largely the preserve of three national networks under direct government
control: NTV, Channel One, and Rossiya. As our theoretical model demonstrates, however,
media bias has an opportunity cost even on state-owned stations, to the extent that the
government values advertising revenue. We should therefore expect media bias on these
networks to be largest when mobilization of the public is especially important. For example,
we might expect media bias to increase in the run-up to a national election, as the government
sacrices any pretense of impartiality for the sake of a large turnout in support of government-
backed parties. At the same time, our model suggests that any such increase may be larger
on state-owned stations with a more commercial orientation, i.e., those that face a larger
opportunity cost from media bias. As we discuss above, Gazprom-controlled NTV meets
25Data from Video International; see http://www.acvi.ru/acvi.exe/viewdoc?id=264.
23this description.
We may examine these propositions directly, using data on television coverage collected by
NewsLab Russia, a media monitoring project based at the University of Wisconsin. Through
this project, the main evening news broadcast (Moscow time) on each of the three national
networks is digitally captured and archived. Native-speaking Russian students watch each
broadcast, applying tags to each news segment (\clip") to describe its content. Each student
has access to a standardized clipping sheet that denes the allowable tags. Student workers
are rotated randomly across the three stations to further reduce the risk that dierences in
clipping style might be confused with dierences in content.
Figure 3 presents data for the period of the 2007 Russian parliamentary election cam-
paign, which ocially began September 5, 2007.26 As a proxy for media bias, we measure
the time advantage given to United Russia, the Kremlin-backed party that received an over-
whelming majority of all votes cast in the election.27 During the campaign, Russian president
Vladimir Putin announced that he would head the party list for United Russia, further sig-
naling the Kremlin's support for that party. Although a full econometric analysis is beyond
the scope of this paper, the data are suggestive. Although Russian election law requires equal
coverage of candidates and parties during an electoral campaign, on all three stations, the
time advantage given to United Russia was substantial, with the Kremlin favorite receiving
approximately half of all time devoted to any of the eleven parties on the ballot. Moreover,
as suggested by our theoretical model, two of the three stations exhibited a statistically
signicant increase in bias increased as the election date approached. However, the increase
was most pronounced on NTV.28 With a greater premium placed on advertising revenue,
NTV appears to ration its bias for when it most matters.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a theoretical framework to analyze government control of the
media. We focus especially on less democratic states where the government uses the media to
mobilize citizens to take actions that may not be in their individual best interest. Our model
emphasizes a fundamental constraint facing any government that hopes to control media
content: bias in reporting reduces the informational content of the news, thus decreasing
viewership among those who value that information. The extent of media bias and incentive
for the government to seize direct control of the media depend on the degree to which the
government internalizes this eect.
Our analysis suggests two paradoxes of media control. First, pro-government bias in
private and state media converge when the government highly values citizen mobilization.
Nonetheless, state ownership is more likely in such environments, as the government nation-
26Technical problems prevented one broadcast on Channel One from being archived over this time period.
27We include in the analysis only broadcasts in which at least one party was mentioned. When more than
one party is mentioned in a particular segment, we allocate that time equally among all parties mentioned.
28The slopes for the linear projections depicted in the gures are as follows: for Channel One, -1.119
(p-value = 0.581); for Rossiya, 2.461 (p-value = 0.087); for NTV, 3.378 (p-value = 0.004). In a regression of
the proportion of time received by United Russia on day of campaign, the estimated eect of day of campaign
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Figure 3: Media bias in 2007 Russian parliamentary election. Time advantage for United
Russia is dened as number of seconds in evening news broadcast devoted to United Russia
minus number of seconds devoted to all other parties combined. Day of campaign is dened
as days from September 5, the ocial start of the campaign. Day 27 (October 1) marks
Putin's announcement that he would head the United Russia list. Only broadcasts where at
least one party is mentioned are included. Each plot depicts, for a single station, observed
values together with tted values and 90-percent condence intervals from a linear prediction.
25alizes private media to save the cost of inducing bias. Second, holding ownership constant,
pro-government bias is smaller in both state-owned and private media when advertising
markets are large. However, an increase in the size of the advertising market may nonethe-
less increase bias, as the threat posed by nancially independent private media causes the
government to seize control of the media for itself.
Our case study of media freedom in postcommunist Russia illustrates these results. Under
both Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin, media bias 
uctuated in response to the mobilizing
needs of the government, with the magnitude of the 
uctuation depending on the ownership
and commercialization of the media outlet. Under Putin, government control has been
facilitated by the seizure of previously private media. Our theoretical framework suggests
two complementary explanations for this latter development: a greater emphasis on use of
the media to support presidential rule, and a dramatic increase in the size of the advertising
market. In each case, the cost to the Kremlin of allowing private media was greater than
before.
Future work might use our framework to explore other elements of government control
of the media. An interesting question, for example, is why the media in many countries are
owned by individuals close to the government rather than by the state directly. One possi-
bility suggested by our theoretical framework is that such individuals may have preferences
over mobilization aligned with|or at least not opposed to|those of the government, thus
lowering the cost of inducing positive coverage while allowing the government to deny that it
exercises direct control of the media. More generally, it is easy to incorporate into our model
a preference among private owners for more or less mobilization. Future work might adopt
this approach to examine anti-government as well as pro-government bias in the media.
Further, as we discuss above, it is straightforward to integrate consumer demand for bias
into our model, as might be the case if some citizens desire to have their views reinforced by
what they read, see, and hear in the media. Although pro-government bias will still reduce
viewership at the margin, so long as consumer demand for pro-government bias is not too
large, additional insights may be gained by extending the model in this direction.
An additional question is whether the government might employ \sticks" rather than
\carrots" to induce media bias when the media are privately owned, e.g., by threatening jail
time rather than promising subsidies.29 At a basic level, this makes little dierence in our
setting: both sticks and carrots are costly to the government, with the size of the threat or
promise necessary to induce a given bias increasing in the size of the advertising market.
The two strategies do dier in whether utility is transferred from the government to the
private owner, but that is inconsequential for our analysis.30 Nonetheless, assuming that the
government has a wider range of instruments with which to in
uence media content may
provide additional understanding of the strategies authoritarian leaders employ to control
the media.
Finally, media dier greatly within and across countries in the extent to which they
provide \infotainment" rather than information. In terms of our model, the broadcast of
human-interest stories rather than hard news might encourage viewership at the expense
29For a model of political in
uence that allows both punishments and rewards, see Dal B o, Dal B o, and
Di Tella (2006).
30In particular, the decision to nationalize a private media outlet depends on the cost to the government
of private ownership, not on the payo to the private owner.
26of time available to in
uence those who do watch the news. The attractiveness of this
strategy may depend both on the mobilizing character of the government and the size of the
advertising market.
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